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AIRPORT SECURITY, TERRORISM, AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: A LOOK BACK
AND A STEP FORWARD
SANFORD L. Dow
A pocketwatch. Four size AA batteries. Several strands of
18-gauge wire. Available at any five and dime, the ingredi-
ents are simple enough. They could fit in a child's lunch
box- or in the lining of a briefcase. But add to these a
fanatic's hatred and a softball-size lump of putty known as
plastique, and you have the recipe for a massive tragedy.'
I. INTRODUCTION
C OMMERCIAL AIR TRAVEL, once considered a lux-
ury for a privileged few, is today a fixture of modern
society. Over 450 million passengers board 6.5 million
flights annually at American airports and more than 700
million pieces of luggage are checked on to U.S. aircraft.
This provides an opportunity for terrorists3 and other
The Next Bomb, LIrE, Mar. 1989, at 130.
2 Id.
3 While no one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance, the no-
tion behind furthering one's views through a system of coercive intimidation has
existed for hundreds of years. For example, the meaning of terrorism was in-
cluded in the 1798 supplement of the Dictionnaire of the Academie Francaise as 'sys-
teme, regime de la terreur.' Dictionnaire, Supplement 775 (Paris, an VII (1798)). The
term "terrorism" apparently has its origin in the Jacobin and Thermidorian dicta-
torships during the French Revolution. PAUL WILKINSON, PoLrrICAL TERRORISM 9
(1974). Revolutionaries used physical violence to produce a foundation for a new
social order, executing members of the aristocracy based solely on their societal
position. Robert Calvert, Terrorism in the Theory of Revolution, in TERRORISM, IDEOL-
OGY & REVOLUTION 27 (Noel O'Sullivan ed., 1986).
The U.S. Congress has defined an "act of terrorism" as: an activity that-
(A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of
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criminals to inflict massive destruction and death on un-
suspecting passengers.
As the only remaining global superpower following the
end of the Cold War, American soil is not immune to se-
curity threats, and may now find itself the target of resent-
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
and (B) appears to be intended- (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to
affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. 1984 Act to
Combat International Terrorism, 18 U.S.C. § 3077 (1993).
Under the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress has also determined "terrorist
activity" to include "the hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an
aircraft)." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (1993).
The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (President's
Commission) maintains that terrorism is a deadly weapon of the weak and the
cowardly and leverages violence against innocent victims. Additionally, state-
sponsored terrorism is a form of surrogate warfare when conventional warfare is
too complex or too expensive. Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security
and Terrorism, at 113 (May 13, 1990) [hereinafter President's Commission Report].
Benjamin Netanyahu, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Israel, explains terror-
ism as "the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the inno-
cent to inspire fear for political ends." Address by U.S. Deputy Attorney General
Arnold I. Bums, The Lawyers Division of the Anti-Defamation League Appeal 3 (Dec. 17,
1986).
Others describe terrorism as "the use of force, or threat of force, directed
against innocent third parties for primarily ideological, financial or psychological
purposes." Robert A. Friedlander, Terrorism and Self-Determination: The Fatal Nexus,
7 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 263, 265 (1979-1980) (quoting Robert Friedlander,
Reflections on Terrorist Havens, 32 NAVAL WAR COL. REV. 59, 60 (1979)).
A dispassionate approach views terrorism as the systematic use of terror, espe-
cially as a means of coercion. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1218 (1984).
Despite the inability to agree upon a uniform definition of terrorism, some ex-
perts believe it is easier to state what terrorism is not. For example, the cliche that
"one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter," was categorically rejected by
the late Senator Henry Jackson who remarked that:
The idea that one person's "terrorist" is another's "freedom
fighter" cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries
don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murders
do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school-
children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate
innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men,
women, and children; terrorist murderers do.
George P. Shultz, The Challenge to Democracies, in TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN
WIN 16, 18 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
For an overview of terrorism, see THE TERRORISM READER: A HISTORICAL AN-
THOLOGY (Walter Laqueur ed., 1978); CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM (William Gut-
teridge ed., 1986); THE POLITICS OF TERRORISM (Michael Stohl ed., 1988).
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ment from a wide range of enemies. 4 Cells of terrorists5
are stationed in the United States and have the capability
to become violent.6 Moreover, as evidenced by the World
Trade Center bombing in New York City, 7 the potential
for terrorism directed against American citizens at home
and abroad in response to U.S. foreign policy decisions,
particularly in the Middle East, cannot be underesti-
mated.8 Terrorism experts predict future threats and at-
tacks by Islamic fundamentalists and other shadowy
4 See, e.g., Robert Reinhold, Blast Wrecks Van of Skipper Who Downed IranJet, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1989, at Al. (the "explosion that rocked the vehicle of Sharon
Lee Rogers while she was on her way to work here this morning may have been set
off as an act of terrorism against the captain, Will C. Rogers 3d"); Robert Han-
dley Defendant Gets 30 Years in Jail Bombing Plot, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1989, at B2.
("A Japanese national described by Federal authorities as one of the first interna-
tional terrorists caught and convicted in the United States was sentenced" by a
judge who described the man as "a member of the Japanese Red Army... [who]
had built and transported bombs to cause 'multiple deaths.' " Robin Wright, U.S.
Hoping to Turn Corner in Terrorism War, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991, at Al. "Since
1985, the United States has convicted more than 460 people on domestic terror-
ism charges and more than 60 on international terrorism charges." Id.; 8 Pro-
Libyans Seized, Plot on North Reported, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 1988 at C3. ("FBI agents
... arrested eight men linked to pro-Libyan activities in the United States, and a
U.S. attorney said one of them was involved in a plot to assassinate a top official").
Between 1982 and 1986, approximately 36,000 firearms were detected at U.S.
airports, leading to more than 15,000 related arrests, and 117 hijackings or re-
lated crimes where attempted, but thwarted. Cecilia Preble, FAA Defends Domestic
Airport Security Measures, AvIATxON WK. & SPACE TECH., June 29, 1987, at 36.
5 International terrorists in the United States are those individuals who are di-
rected from abroad and who target foreign groups or governments, including the
United.States government and its citizenry. Cecilia Albin, The Politics of Terrorism:
A Contemporary Survey, in THE POLmCS OF TERRORISM 183, 194 (Barry Rubin ed.,
1989).
6 Id. at 180. International terrorists operating in the United States have been
able to generate significant support, both financially and from the refusal of sup-
porters to provide information to law enforcement authorities on the terrorist's
activities. The necessary infrastructure is also already in place from which a base
of operations may be conducted. Id. at 195.
7 Robert D. McFadden, Blast Hits Trade Center, Bomb Suspected; 7 Killed, Thousands
Flee Smoke in Towers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at Al.
8 Ross Gelbspan, Terrorism Threat Triggers Alert in Nation and Anxiety in Public; War
in Middle East, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1991, at 1; Michael Schachner & Sara J.
Harty, Terrorism Fears Remain Despite End of Gulf War, Bus. INS., Mar. 11, 1991, at 3.
In the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) most recent report to Congress
on civil aviation security, the FAA stated that "American interests also continue to
be targeted by terrorist organizations and those countries supporting interna-
tional terrorist activities." President's Commission Report, supra note 3, at 40.
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Middle Eastern factions which operate in a dark nether-
world9 and elements on the political fringe, furthermore,
may attempt to undermine democratic openings around
the world, particularly in the former Yugoslavia.' 0 Com-
pounding this problem, some hijackers may have lost any
political or ideological rationale for committing these acts
of air terrorism." Their goal is sheer intimidation.' 2
With the development of sophisticated modern weap-
onry, power, defined simply as the capacity to disrupt or
destroy, has descended to smaller and smaller groups.' 3
Additionally, because of the rapid technological advance-
ments made in explosives used by terrorists,' 4 coupled
President's Commission Report, supra note 3; see Jim Wolf, CIA Chief Says Terrorism
Threat Unchanged Since Gulf War, REUTERS, May 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Reuters File; see also Oliver B. Revell, "Terrorism Today," FBI Law Enforce-
ment Bull., Oct. 1987, at 2.
10 Pricilla Painton, Who Could Have Done It?, TIME, Mar. 8, 1993, at 33. Balkan
groups have been involved in a series of terrorist acts in the United States. For
example, in 1976 Croatian nationalists hijacked a TWA flight travelling from New
York City to Chicago, diverting it to Paris. Id.
11 Some terrorists "may have lost their political identity, having become in-
creasingly nihilistic. One need only scratch the surface of their espoused Marxism
to find their true purpose: destruction of the establishment, whatever government
is in power." ROBERT KUPPERMAN & DAVID TRENT, TERRORISM: THREAT, REALITY,
RESPONSE 39-40 (1979).
12 It has been written:
The principle of terrorism as a psychological weapon [is illustrated
by a Chinese proverb]: "To kill one and frighten 10,000 others."
The 'one' here is the immediate victim, but the '10,000' are the real
target. The dramatic fate of the one intimidates the 10,000 into
yielding concessions to remove what they perceive as an ultimate
threat to themselves. In the modern world, particularly in democra-
cies, the terrorists aim at isolating the country's leadership from the
people and forcing changes by 'popular demand' in line with their
own political or ideological objectives."
Bradley Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An Overview,
13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 117, 129 n.66 (1986).
I3 Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism: Trends and Potentialities, in LEGAL AND
OTHER ASPECTS OF TERRORISM 439, 495 (Edwin N. Lowe & Harry D. Shargel eds.,
1979). Massive quantities of Semtex, an odorless, virtually undetectable plastic
explosive compound, are available to terrorists worldwide. Former Czechoslova-
kia President Vaclav Havel has even admitted that his country sold 1000 tons of
Semtex to Libya, an amount Havel said was sufficient to outfit the world terrorist
community with the ability to make bombs for 150 years. Glenn Frankel, Havel
Details Sale of Explosives to Libya, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1990, at AIS.
14 An example of one of the difficulties confronted by security personnel is
identifying an explosive material like semtex, used in the bombing of Pan Ameri-
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with a reduction in the budget for counterterrorist re-
can Flight 103. Semtex can be molded like clay and take on a configuration that
would not trigger a response from security personnel or sniffer dogs, or can be
rolled into a sheet less than one-quarter of an inch thick and used as a liner for
luggage. Denise Gellene, Long After Lockerbie, Air Safety Still A Worry, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1990, at D3.
There is an international movement to attempt to prevent the undetected
spread of plastic explosives. In March, 1991, forty countries (including the United
States and the former Soviet Union, but excluding Iraq, Yemen, and Libya) signed
a treaty at the headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization re-
quiring manufacturers in signatory countries to include a chemical compound in
plastic explosives that would set off a warning buzzer on vapor detectors available
to airports. Treaty to Make Bombs Easier For Airports To Spot, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1991, at A29.
The FAA issued a rule that would have required installing a new technology,
thermal neutron analyzers, (TNA) to inspect checked luggage (but no carry-on
luggage) at major domestic and international airports. TNAs, which weigh 14
tons and are the size of a small truck, rely on computers and require minimal
training and no sophisticated judgments by airline security personnel. The
machine scans luggage with beams of protons, positively-charged particles in the
nuclei of atoms. Atoms of the luggage's contents capture some of the neutrons,
immediately discharging gamma rays. Nitrogen, an element found in high con-
centration in all conventional explosives, then emits gamma rays and the machine
detects these high-energy rays, setting off an alarm. James Popkin, Holes in the
Security Web, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 18, 1991, at 39.
The effectiveness of TNAs however, is dubious at best. Some scientists believe
"there is no way [a] TNA can work for little bombs ... unless you violate the law
of physics." Id. This is so because as the amount of plastic explosives in luggage
drops, it is more difficult for the machine to make a distinction between gamma
rays emitted from the nitrogen in explosives and from nitrogen in other sources
like cheese, leather, and wool. "Any terrorist with a rudimentary knowledge of
physics can easily obtain materials to cloak these explosives from TNAs scrutiny."
Id. at 41. Additionally, the President's Commission recommended stopping the
deployment of TNAs because they would not have spotted the plastic explosives
that destroyed Pan Am 103, and they have a high false alarm rate when tuned for
sensitivity to bombs similar to the one used on Pan Am 103. The Commission
also called for increasing research and development efforts for alternative sys-
tems. David Perlman, Baggage Screening Called Cumbersome, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14,
1991, at A4; Carl H. Lavin, New Machines Can Detect Terrorists' Bombs, Usually, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1989, at Cl.; Russell W. Baker, Bomb-Detection Device Debated,
CHRIST. ScI. MON., Sept. 27, 1989, at 7. It was also the concern of the President's
Commission that requiring air carriers to devote significant financial resources to
TNAs would extinguish interest in developing different and superior technologies
and the widespread deployment of TNAs could mislead the travelling public by
offering a false sense of security. President's Commission Report, supra note 3, at 65-6.
Under the Aviation Security Improvement Act, airports are not required to in-
stall TNAs until the FAA certifies that the machines can detect small amounts of
explosives capable of destroying a commercial aircraft with sixty or more passen-
ger seats. Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, H.R. 5200, 101st Cong.,
2d. Sess., § 320 (1990); 136 CONG. REC. H8469 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990).
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search and development,1 5 the travelling members of the
American public will find themselves in a precarious
position. 16
Individual civil liberties, often taken for granted by
many Americans, may be at risk as the government at-
tempts to respond to these threats of terrorism. 17 Histori-
cally, suspicion and fear of domestic and foreign
subversion have been pervasive in American society. 18 To
1 The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) conducted a
study which determined that the $70 million in funding for anti-terrorism re-
search was .7 percent of equivalent Department of Defense research and develop-
ment and 3 percent of the appropriation given to the space station. The funding
is scattered among twenty separate federal agencies and the only government-
wide program, administered by the State Department, receives $2 million annu-
ally, approximately one-fifth of what it received in 1986. The study reported that
it was particularly difficult for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which "is
unable to pursue many promising research projects, especially in the area of ex-
plosives detection, because of the minuscule amount of resources available (less
than $100,000 per year)"). George Lardner, Jr., U.S. Faulted on Antiterrorism Fund-
ing: Congress Told New Airport Bomb-Detection Devices Are Too Touchy, WASH. POST, Feb.
27, 1991, at A23.
16 "An airplane in flight, despite all of its engineering sophistication, is a
uniquely fragile and vulnerable target when a passenger or crewmember is
threatened by a weapon or an explosive." United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670
(2d Cir. 1972).
'7 President's Commission Report, supra note 3, at 114. "The more security meas-
ures are imposed, the more fundamental freedoms are restricted. Searching bags
and screening passengers constitute intrusions upon privacy." Id. The concern of
overzealous government officials, furthermore, was eloquently articulated by Jus-
tice Louis Brandeis over sixty-five years ago:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib-
erty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
IS For example, in the charged atmosphere created by the French Revolution
and a growing United States domestic partisan struggle, the Act ofJuly 14, 1798,
ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired), commonly referred to as The Alien and Sedition Act
of 1798, was used by the Federalist Administration to oppress the Republicans,
led by Jefferson and Madison, for their political views. The Federalists andJeffer-
sonians "took turns accusing one another of subversion." FREEDOM AT RISK; SE-
CRECY, CENSORSHIP, AND REPRESSION IN THE 1980s 5 (Richard 0. Curry ed., 1988)
[hereinafter FREEDOM AT RISK].
The first significant federal domestic intelligence program was established dur-
ing World War I, when thousands of American citizens were investigated by the
Bureau of Investigation for "un-American activities." Don Edwards, Reordering
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alleviate these concerns, the United States government
has sometimes acted to restrict certain citizens' rights in
times of political or civil unrest.' 9 In June, 1940, for ex-
ample, Congress passed the Alien Registration Act.2 °
This law, generally known as the Smith Act, made illegal
membership in any group that advocated the forceful
overthrow of the United States government. The Act also
served as a mechanism by which the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) could attempt to justify illegal investi-
gations into individuals' political beliefs.2 ' Following the
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States govern-
ment interned Japanese-American citizens in "relocation
camps," the only "crime" being that they were of the
same racial extraction as the enemy with which the United
The Priorities of the FBI in Light of the End of the Cold War, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 59,67
(1991).
In 1956, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover instituted a far reaching program of
domestic surveillance under the auspices of an FBI counterintelligence group
known as COINTELPRO (an acronym for Counterintelligence Program).
COINTELPRO's operations in the 1960s included targeting not only college stu-
dents who were opposed to American policy during the Vietnam conflict, but also
non-violent Black civil rights groups. By 1976, the group was conducting 4868
domestic security investigations and by 1981, the FBI was maintaining a file on
over 500,000 Americans. Geoffrey Stone, The Reagan Administration, the First
Amendment, and FBI Domestic Security Administration, the First Amendment, and FBI Do-
mestic Security Investigations, in FREEDOM AT RISK 272, 275-77 (1988). In 1988,
under the guise of its "Library Awareness Program," the FBI even sent in agents
to public and university libraries requesting information on foreign nationals who
were reading various unclassified scientific and technical journals. FBI Counter-
intelligence Visits to Libraries: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988) (testi-
mony of Duane Webster, Executive Director, Association of Research Libraries).
This was not, however, the first instance in which the FBI had investigated library
records. As early as 1944, FBI agents recruited a librarian at the University of
California to "produce records" on the reading habits of a poet, Muriel Rukeyser.
The FBI described Rukeyser as "a well-known poetess who is alleged to have
mixed considerable left-wing politics with her iambic pentameters." NATALIE
ROBINS, ALIEN INK: THE FBI's WAR ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 190 (1992).
19 See generally, ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA:
FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT 1978 (1978); RICHARD 0. CURRY, CONSPIRACY: THE
FEAR OF SUBVERSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1972); MURRAY LEVIN, POLITICAL
HYSTERIA IN AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY FOR REPRESSION (1971).
20 Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 23, 54 Stat. 670,671-73 (1940)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385-87 (1988)).
21 Id.; ROBINS, supra note 18, at 187.
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States was then at war.22 In the 1950's, the hysteria of the
Red menace created by Senator Joseph McCarthy's com-
munist witch-hunts resulted in legislative restrictions on
the constitutional freedoms of many patriotic citizens. 3
Between 1969 and 1979, the FBI secretly investigated the
women's liberation movement, amassing a file of nearly
3000 pages,24 and during the Reagan Administration, the
State Department attempted to vigorously enforce the
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952,25 a law that denies visas to
foreigners whose views are considered dangerous to
American ideals and values. The desired goal of the Ad-
ministration was to bar individuals opposed to the Reagan
22 Pursuant to Executive Order 9066, over 120,000 persons of Japanese ances-
try, 70,000 of whom were U.S. citizens, were forced into "relocation camps". In
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), by a vote of six to three, the
Supreme Court held that it was constitutional to confine Japanese-American citi-
zens, premised on the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the
war powers of Congress. Id. at 217. Internment was a reasonable military precau-
tion, and the danger was believed to be so great that there was no time to set up
procedures to judge each Japanese-American on an individual basis. It was also
assumed that Japanese-American's racial ties to Imperial Japan, regardless of citi-
zenship or loyalty, would result in sabotage, treason, and perfidy. Id. at 237-242
(Murphy, J., dissenting); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). For a historical treatment ofJapanese-Amer-
icans in American jurisprudence, see FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE:
THE LAW AND JAPANESE-AMERICANS (1976).
23 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Supreme Court sus-
tained the conviction of 12 Communist Party members for conspiracy to violate
the Smith Act); Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 933 (1950).
24 ROBINS, supra note 18, at 327. This file, containing reports from meetings,
demonstrations, and membership lists, examined various women's groups affilia-
tions with other organizations, such as the Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS) and the Black Panthers. One absurd report, describing a gathering, noted:
"[t]he women, in general, appeared to be hippies, lesbians or from far-out groups.
Most of them were colorfully dressed, but the majority wore faded blue jeans.
Most seemed to be making a real attempt to be unattractive." Id.
25 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended in different sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50
U.S.C. (1988)) (prior to amendment by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-649, 104 Stat. 4978). The McCarran-Walter Act, passed in 1950 over Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman's veto, required communists to register with the U.S. Attor-
ney General and agree to be apprehended if a national security emergency arose.
Playwright Arthur Miller called the McCarran-Walter Act "one of the pieces of
garbage left behind by the sinking of the great scow of McCarthyism." Mark
Schapiro, The Excludables, in FREEDOM AT RISK, supra note 17, at 165.
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policy in Central America. 6 More recently, approxi-
mately one week before the United Nations imposed a
deadline for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait,
FBI agents began questioning American citizens of Arabic
heritage about their support for the Persian Gulf War and
whether they had any knowledge of planned terrorist at-
tacks.27 Today, critics of the FBI contend that the policy
of combatting "terrorism" may be used by the FBI in the
same manner "communism" was used by the FBI in the
1950s, "as a pretext to repress radicals and dissenters. 2 8
This Comment will address the governmental response
to air piracy and terrorism and discuss the methods insti-
tuted by Congress to control the spread of these crimes.
Through both the use of electronic surveillance to safe-
guard domestic security, and through specific legislation
attempting to combat hijacking and terrorism directed to-
wards air carriers, the United States government has
taken actions to solve or, at least, mitigate these problems
that some assert may involve potentially grave restrictions
on individuals' Fourth Amendment rights.
This article begins with a historical overview of the
American response to air piracy and air terrorism and
next discusses the four approaches within the Fourth
Amendment generally taken to justify airport searches
and seizures. It analyzes the role of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (FISA) in fighting this nemesis and
demonstrates that, at a minimum, the FISA is a legitimate
mechanism to assist in combatting the problem.
26 A list of individuals denied entry into the United States since the enactment
of the McCarran-Walter Act includes English novelist Graham Greene, Nobel lau-
reates Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Pablo Neruda and Czeslaw Milosz, Chile's Hor-
tensia de Allende, the widow of Salvador Allende, and Mexican writer Carlos
Fuentes. Schapiro, supra note 25, at 163-164.
27 Lisa Belkin, For Many Arab-Americans, F.B.I. Scrutiny Renews Fears, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1991, § 1, at 1; Sharon LaFraniere, FBI Starts Interviewing Arab-American
Leaders; Watch Ordered on Iraqi Embassy, Mission, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1991, at A14.
28 RoBINs, supra note 18, at 371; Ashley Dunn, McCarthy Era Legacy Survives With
U.S. Government Blacklist, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1991, at A9.
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II. HISTORY OF HIJACKING, AIR TERRORISM
AND THE GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE
Airplane hijacking 29 and terrorist attacks on air carriers,
for both political and non-political purposes, have had a
long and ugly tradition, beginning in the earliest days of
civil aviation. The first recorded hijacking in the world
occurred in 1930. Peruvian revolutionaries took control
of an aircraft and bombarded the ground with political
pamphlets.30 The first recorded bombing of a commercial
aircraft took place in May 1949 when a man and woman
hired two ex-convicts to place a time bomb on a Philip-
pine Airline's flight on which the woman's husband was a
passenger, killing all thirteen passengers aboard, includ-
ing the husband.3 ' The first American carrier hijacked
was in 1961 when an Eastern Airlines airplane was seized
and ordered to be diverted to Cuba. 2 Congress quickly
responded to this event by making aircraft piracy and cer-
tain other related activities federal crimes.33 The 1961
amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 195834 made
aircraft piracy punishable by either death or imprison-
ment for not less than twenty years, and the amendment
29 The word "hijack" may have derived in 19th-century England from
vagabonds who greeted each other with the phrase, "Hi Jack". With the rise of
crime, this warning served as a signal that a holdup was about to occur. See ERIC
PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH
288 (1963); Thomas J. Andrews, Screening Travelers at the Airport to Prevent Hijacking:
A New Challenge for the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 657-58
n.l. (1974).
30 JAMES A. AREY, THE SKY PIRATES 49 (1972).
11 Humphrey G. Dawson, Civil Aviation, Hiacking and International Terrorism. An
Historical and Legal Review, 15 INT'L Bus. LAw. 57, 58 (1987). Worldwide, between
1949 and 1990, there were ninety-five documented explosions aboard commercial
aircrafts, resulting in over 2100 deaths. Foreign Airport Security: Hearing Before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 197-98 app. 22 (1989).
12 AREY, supra note 30, at 55. The first act of aviation sabotage aboard a United
States air carrier, however, occurred on November 1, 1955. President's Commission
Report, supra note 3, at 160 app. 22. A United Air Lines jet exploded near Long-
mont, Colorado eleven minutes after takeoff, when a dynamite bomb detonated in
a baggage compartment, killing 39 passengers and 5 crewmembers. Id.
- Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, (i)-(n) 75 Stat. 466 (current version
at 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)-(m)(o) (1988).
,4 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
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also contained a lesser offense of "interference with flight
crew or cabin crew members," punishable by a monetary
fine or imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty
years, unless a deadly weapon was used.3 5 In the latter in-
stance, imprisonment could be for life.36
In 1963, the United States became a signatory to the
Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, an international agreement
designed to address questions and concerns of jurisdic-
tion hijacking cases.3 7 The Convention extended the
usual territorial rules of each signatory nation's criminal
codes, so that each nation had jurisdiction over criminal
acts which took place on aircraft registered in that coun-
try, regardless of where the aircraft was when the criminal
act transpired. The Tokyo Convention was largely ineffec-
tive, however, because it did not specifically make hi-
jacking a crime and did not provide for the extradition of
captured hijackers.3 8
The number of hijackings of American commercial air-
planes dropped to an average of about two per year be-
tween 1961 and 1967,39 and was not a serious problem
again until 1968 when eighteen successful attempts on
American aircrafts and twelve foreign carriers were car-
ried out.40 The following year, thirty-three of forty at-
tempts on U.S. carriers were successful.4 1 Once again, the
35 Dawson, supra note 31, at 60.
36 Id.
37 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969). Interest-
ingly, this was not the first global attempt to address the problem. Dawson, supra
note 31, at 58. In 1937, the League of Nations sponsored two Conventions, the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and the Convention
for the Creation of an International Criminal Court. Id. Both Conventions were
signed, but neither was ever implemented. Id.
38 Patrick W. McGinley & Stephen F. Down, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Rea-
sonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 295-96 (1972).
39 James A. Brodsky, Terry and the Pirates: Constitutionality of Airport Searches and
Seizures, 62 Ky. LJ. 623, 624 (1974).
40 Narinder Aggarwala, Political Aspects of Hijacking, in INTERNATIONAL CONCILIA-
TION 7, 9 (Nov. 1971).
41 Id.
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United States entered into international agreements di-
rected at resolving complications left unanswered by the
Tokyo Convention.42
In 1968, the United States government organized a spe-
cial Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) task force
composed of FAA staff members, airline representatives,
and individuals from the Departments of Justice and
Commerce who either had psychological, legal, engineer-
ing, or administrative backgrounds.4 3 Their task was to
develop a method to detect individuals who possessed
concealed weapons. 44 The task force developed and im-
plemented the first anti-hijacking system which included:
(1) notices to the general public, (2) the use of a "hijacker
profile, ' 45 (3) the use of magnetometers to detect any
42 The first convention, the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft 1970, ratified by the U.S. Senate on September 8, 1971, pro-
vided for mandatory punishment or extradition of hijackers and attempted to de-
fine the offense of hijacking. 117 CONG. REC. 13,888-89 (1971). The Hague
Convention did not, however, address the threat of explosives being placed on
commercial aircrafts. The second convention, the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, ratified on Oc-
tober 3, 1972, augmented the Hague Convention by including sabotage and other
threats against an airplane. 118 CONG. REC. 33,367-76.
In 1978, the United States and other members of the Economic Group of 7
signed the Bonn Declaration, an agreement to halt air service to and from any
country that does not either extradite or prosecute terrorists for hijacking. The
Venice Annex, signed at the 1987 Summit of the Heads of State of the Economic
Group of 7, expanded the Bonn Declaration to include stopping air service in
cases of sabotage. To date, the Bonn Declaration has been implemented only
once, in 1981, against Afghanistan following the hijacking of a Pakistani aircraft.
Dawson, supra note 31 at 62. The President's Commission has attacked the Decla-
ration, claiming that the political will is often not always forthcoming from Group
members, citing for example, the refusal of members to accept the request of the
British government that both air service and diplomatic relations be severed with
Syria following-the attempted bombing of an El Al airplane at Heathrow Airport.
President's Commission Report, supra note 3, at 37.
43 See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
44 FAA Report on Detection Devices: Hearings on Aviation Safety and Aircraft Piracy
Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 98-102 (Feb. 5, 1969).
45 The "hijacker profile" consists of 25 behavioral characteristics associated
with hijackers and terrorists. The results of the profile have never been released
to the public. Robert E. Dallos, Passengers at Stake: Airlines Try to Out Think Terrorists,
L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1986, at 1. Most of the world's known terrorists are univer-
sity-educated males between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-five and are from
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metal objects on passengers who met the profile,46 (4) in-
terviews with selected passengers, and (5) frisks or
searches of suspected passengers.47
Initially, the screening system was entirely voluntary
and left to the discretion of the individual carriers, but in
1972 the FAA promulgated a rule requiring all U.S. air-
lines to initiate a screening system that was acceptable to
the FAA.48 Screening of all passengers was to include, but
not be limited to, behavioral profiles, the use of a magne-
tometer, identification checks, and physical searches.49
The following January, the FAA terminated this voluntary
approach and instead made it mandatory that all passen-
gers, not only those passengers identified under the pro-
file, be checked prior to boarding by passing through a
metal detector. °
In 1974, faced with a growing problem of airline secur-
middle to upper class families. Generally, their political views have been shaped
by the philosophies of either the extreme left or right, which advocate violence
and have disdain for the underpinnings of constitutional democracy. Charles A.
Russell and Bowman H. Miller, Profiles of a Terrorist, in TERRORISM, AN INTERNA-
TIONAL JOURNAL 1 no. 1 (1977). Based on a number of interviews conducted by
the Los Angeles Times, "[tihe most likely people to fit a terrorist profile, and thus
to receive extraordinary scrutiny, are young, Arab-looking males. And if such an
individual has a passport issued by a Middle Eastern country with which the
United States has poor relations - Libya, Syria, or Iran, for example, - a bell
figuratively goes off." Dallos, supra, at 1. The fact that a defendant matches sev-
eral characteristics of a hijacker profile does not, however, constitute reasonable
suspicion to search their luggage. United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752
(N.D. Cal. 1971). Furthermore, while the use of a profile does not detract from
the evidentiary significance of an officer's personal observations, the profile does
not, in and of itself, necessarily constitute reasonable suspicion on which to search
a person or his luggage. A court will require an officer to articulate the factors
that led to his conclusion that a search was justified. United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). See supra notes 19-29 for a discussion of the constitutional
requirements of a "stop-and-frisk" search, such as that described above.
46 A magnetometer electronically detects the presence of ferrous metals. "[Tihe
operation of the [magnetometer] requires no understanding of its theory. Its cali-
bration is easy and its adjustment can be assured by simple visual observation."
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1085-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
47 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 1-6(a) (2d ed. 1987).
48 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1992).
49 FAA Press Release No. 72-26 (Feb. 6, 1972).
50 See LAFAVE, supra note 47, § 6. The use of an x-ray machine, or magnetome-
ter to ascertain the contents of a closed bag constitutes a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment since the machine's very purpose is to dis-
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ity, Congress passed a two-title statute directed at the
problem of hijacking. 5 Title I, the Anti-hijacking Act of
1974, was intended to implement the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the Hague
Convention).52 Title II, the Air Transportation Security
Act of 1974, empowered the Administrator of the FAA to
create and monitor security measures for preventing acts
of hijacking and criminal violence.53 The Administrator
was directed to prescribe reasonable regulations that re-
quired all passengers and all property intended to be car-
ried on a commercial aircraft be screened by weapon-
detecting procedures or facilities employed or operated
by employees or agents of the air carrier prior to passen-
gers boarding the aircraft.54 The statute also empowered
the Administrator to prevent any air carrier, intrastate air
carrier, or foreign air carrier from transporting any indi-
vidual who did not consent to a search of his person or
property.5 5 The purpose of the search is to ascertain
whether the person is carrying either on himself or in his
property a "dangerous weapon, explosive, or other de-
structive substance." 56
The FAA's role in aviation security expanded in 1985
with the passage of the Foreign Airport Security Act.57
The Act was signed in the wake of a hijacking of a Trans
World Airlines (TWA) flight from Athens, Greece, during
which a U.S. Navy Petty Officer, Robert Stethem, was
cover the presence of metals of privacy. United States v. Doe, 786 F. Supp. 1073,
1079 (D. Puerto Rico 1991).
"' CoNt. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3996; S. REP. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973); H.R. REP.
No. 885, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
52 H.R. REP. No. 885, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974).
5- Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 415 (1974) (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301,
1356, 1357, 1472, 1511, 1515 (1988)).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1356(a) (1988).
55 Id.
16 Id. § 1511(a)(1)-(2).
57 Foreign Airport Security Act, Publ. L. No. 99-83, § 551, 99 Stat. 190, 222
(1985) (signed into law on Aug. 8, 1985 as part of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83) (amending § 1115 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1515) (1988).
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murdered. The Act mandates FAA assessment of the ade-
quacy of both the security procedures at foreign airports
served by U.S. carriers and the security procedures of for-
eign air carriers flying into United States airports. 58 If
the Secretary of Transportation determines that deficien-
cies exist in security, the foreign nation is notified and
provided with a recommendation of steps necessary to
correct the inadequacies in the security procedures. 59 If
that nation fails to implement these recommendations or
fails to take other appropriate steps, sanctions may be
imposed.60
The crash of Pan American World Airways Flight 103
(Flight 103) on December 21, 1988, caused by a terrorist
bomb that exploded while the plane was enroute from
London's Heathrow Airport to John F. Kennedy Airport
in New York, resulted in the death of 258 innocent victims
onboard and at least fifteen people on the ground in
Lockerbie, Scotland. 6' On August 4, 1989, President
George Bush responded to the destruction of Flight 103
through Executive Order 12,686 by creating the Presi-
dent's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
(the "Commission").62 The Commission's responsibility
was to appraise the complete effectiveness of the U.S. civil
aviation security system, including reviewing options for
58 49 U.S.C. app. § 1515(a)(1988).
59 Id. § 1515(d).
60 Id. § 1515(e). These sanctions include: (1) the mandatory issuance of a travel
advisory by the Secretary of State; (2) identifying the non-complying airport by
publication in the Federal Register; (3) advertising the decision publicly; and (4) in-
cluding a travel advisory with tickets for flights between the United States and that
airport. Id. Furthermore, all assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
and the Arms Control Act to that country may also be suspended. COUNTER TER-
RORISM POLICY AND EMBASSY SECURITY IN EASTERN EUROPE, REPORT OF A STUDY
MISSION TO EASTERN EUROPE BY THE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 100th Cong. 2d
Sess, at IX (1988).
61 N.Y Bound Jet crashes: 258 Die, Flaming 747 Slams Town in Scotland, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 22, 1988, at 1; Edward Cody, Pan AmJet Crashes in Scotland, Killing at Least 273:
Dead Include 38 Syracuse Students, 15 People in Town, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1988, at
Al; Worldwide Hunt Launched for Bombers of Pan Am Jet: Explosion Blamed in Death of
270, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1988, at 1; STEVEN EMERSON & BRIAN DUFFY, THE FALL
OF PAN AM 103 (1990).
62 Exec. Order No. 12,686.
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addressing terrorist threats.63 In its final report delivered
on May 15, 1990, the Commission advanced more than
sixty recommendations to the President for improving the
U.S. civil aviation security program. 4 Following the filing
of the report, Congress enacted the Aviation Security Im-
provement Act of 1990 (the "Aviation Security Act" or
the "Act"). 65 The Aviation Security Act was signed by the
President on November 16, 1990 and was designed to en-
hance civil aviation by providing increased security from
terrorism and other criminal acts against passengers of
66American carriers.
Title I of the Act amends the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 and establishes the position of Director of Intelli-
gence and Security in the Office of the Secretary of Trans-
portation. The Director's duties and powers include,
inter alia, the assessment of intelligence information relat-
ing to long-term security, and the development of poli-
cies, strategies, and plans for handling threats made to
airline security.68 The Aviation Security Act also com-
mands the FAA to accelerate research and development,
requires implementation of new technologies to counter-
act terrorist threats, and demands stricter guidelines in
the hiring practices of the airlines.6 9 For example, section
105(a) of the Aviation Security Act amends Section 316 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 195870 by prescribing criteria
for the hiring and continued employment of air carrier
and airport security personnel. 7' The new standards in-
clude minimum training and retraining requirements,
63 Id.
64 President's Commission Report, supra note 3, at ii. These recommendations
ranged from suggesting new technologies to deal with terrorism to methods to
comfort the families of victims of terrorism. Id. at 121-25.
65 Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, 104 Stat.
3066 (1990) (codified in assorted sections of 49 U.S.C. App. and 22 U.S.C.).
6 14 C.F.R. §§ 107, 108 (1992).
67 49 U.S.C. app. § 1526 (Supp. 11 1990).
- 136 CONG. REc. 16,539 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990).
6 49 U.S.C. app. § 1357(d) (Supp. H 1990).
70 Pub. L. No. 85-276 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1357 (Supp. H 1990)).
71 14 C.F.R. §§ 107, 108 (1992).
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staffing levels, language skills, and a minimum education
level. 2
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
AIRPORT SECURITY
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT GENERALLY
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides:
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.73
The Supreme Court has struggled with the precise
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and has even re-
marked that "[t]he course of true law pertaining to
searches and seizures . . .has not- to put it mildly- run
smooth. ' 74 This confusion, moreover, has extended to
Fourth Amendment searches conducted in airports as law
enforcement officers attempt to prevent terrorists from
creating fear and uncertainty. 5
Under the Fourth Amendment, only unreasonable
searches and seizures are prohibited.78 Identifying what is
reasonable generally focuses on the totality and nature of
72 Id. § 108.31.
7- U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
74 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
75 In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), the Court remarked that:
Even in the discrete category of airport encounters, there will be
endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation
that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a para-
graph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to the question
whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 506-07.
76 United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
947 (1972). The Supreme Court has stated that a "search" implies an intrusive
"quest by an officer of the law." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). A search
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the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure."
When air travel is considered, determining reasonable-
ness requires balancing the individual's right to be free of
meddlesome searches with the greater societal interest in
safe air travel. 8 This is so because numerous Supreme
Court decisions have recognized that the basic purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to "safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by gov-
has also been defined as a government intrusion into infringement of an individ-
ual's privacy. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140-49 (1978).
A "seizure" within the Fourth Amendment occurs "only if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980). The court has further elucidated the seizure test: "In order to determine
whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the
circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct
would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Florida v.
Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991) (emphasis added).
77 United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) ("What is
reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or
seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself."); Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128, 137 (1978) ("[A]lmost without exception in evaluating alleged viola-
tions of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective as-
sessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known
to him.").
78 United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1986). In
United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972),
Judge Friendly wrote in an oft-quoted concurring opinion that:
When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and mil-
lions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of
a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness,
so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of
preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable scope and
the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a
search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.
Id. at 675.
This view, however, must be balanced with the concern that abuse which re-
strains individual liberties does not occur:
[I]t is the very ubiquitousness of airport security checks that calls for
the greatest vigilance on our part. Because these checks touch the
lives of so many, because they have become such an accepted part of
our existence, they are capable of great abuse. Liberty-the freedom
from unwarranted intrusion by government- is as easily lost through
insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs
too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can
be as deadly as the shark.
United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989).
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ernment officials." 79
It is well established that screening an airline passenger
and his luggage constitutes a "search" within the context
of the Fourth Amendment.8 0 In Florida v. Royer8 the
Supreme Court held that a "seizure" occurred in the con-
text of police questioning at an airport when the police
asked the defendant to go with them to an interview room
while deliberately withholding the defendant's airline
ticket and drivers license during questioning.82 The de-
fendant was not able to "decline the officers' requests"8 3
for an interview and, thus, the Court recognized that it
was neither a sensible nor a realistic option for a "reason-
able" traveler to abandon his identification and travel
papers .84
All arrests and the majority of searches and seizures
must be supported by probable cause.8 5 Probable cause
exists if facts and circumstances exist within a police of-
ficer's knowledge that would be sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an of-
fense has been committed or is being committed.86
Courts have generally held that searches conducted
without a warrant supported by probable cause are "per se
unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions. 87 Four excep-
tions to the warrant requirement have been advanced and
79 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
80 Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770.
81 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
82 Id. at 501-02. "[A]sking for and examining [a detainee's] ticket and his
driver's license were no doubt permissible in themselves, but when the officers...
asked him to accompany them to the police room, while retaining his ticket and
driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart, [the
detainee] was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
83 Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2389.
84 Royer, 460 U.S. at 502.
"5 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
86 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
87 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Some other exceptions not
discussed in this comment include:
(1) Searches conducted incident to a lawful arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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analogized to justify the constitutionality of airport
searches. These four exceptions, each of which will be
subsequently discussed, are: (1) the stop-and-frisk search;
(2) administrative searches; (3) the border search; and
(4) searches based on express or implied consent.
The four theories used to justify airport searches con-
ducted without a warrant or probable cause concern
carry-on items only, and are not applicable to checked
luggage.88 Searches of checked luggage must be made
upon probable cause and not as a matter of routine proce-
dure.89 A search warrant is required, and unless exigency
can be established, based upon the individual facts of each
case, a non-consenual search is violative of the Fourth
Amendment. 90 If, however, an x-ray scan detects that a
piece of luggage contains something that appears to be
either dangerous to the flight, or that cannot be positively
identified as benign, the luggage is subject to a full hand
search until the object has been determined to be
harmless.9
B. THE TERRY DOCTRINE: STOP-AND-FRISK SEARCHES
The first exception to the search warrant requirement
that is used to justify searches at airports, the stop-and-
frisk search, was enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio. 92
(2) Inventory searches of a prisoner's personal effects. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462
U.S. 640 (1983).
(3) The automobile exception. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.
(4) The plain view doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
(5) The hot pursuit exception. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
(6) Searches of schoolchildren's possessions at school. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
88 United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
902 (1974). "The screening procedures prescribed by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration are designed to thwart the carry-on threat and do not provide for
searching or magnetometer testing of checked luggage." Id. at 518.
89 United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942, 947 (5th Cir. 1974).
0 United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
91 United States v. Clay, 638 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 917
(1981).
392 U.S. 1 (1968). An initial question in any situation involving a stop-and-
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Terry held that a police officer, without a search warrant,
could stop and briefly detain a person for investigative
purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion sup-
ported by articulable facts that criminal activity is stirring,
even if the officer lacks probable cause to arrest.9" A
patdown search of a detainee may also be justified under
this exception if a police officer has reason to fear that an
individual may produce a weapon that would endanger
the safety of either the officer or others nearby. 94 The
patdown is limited, however, to the stopped person's
outer clothing, for no more is necessary to detect the
presence of a weapon that might be available for instanta-
neous use against the officer.95
The narrow constitutional question before the Court in
Terry was whether it was per se unreasonable for a police
officer to seize an individual and subject him to a limited
search for a weapon if there was no probable cause for the
frisk search is whether the detainee has been stopped. The questioning of a citi-
zen on the street by a police officer does not necessarily constitute a Terry stop:
"[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures'
of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of author-
ity, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure' has occurred." Id. at 19 n.16; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215
(1984) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976))
("[T]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and
citizens, but is designed 'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by law
enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.' ");
Royer, 460 U.S. at 497 ("[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another pub-
lic place, [or] by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions ... ").
After a law enforcement officer has made a reasonable stop, the government's
interest in permitting a frisk is based not on "the prevention or the detection of
crime, but rather the protection of the officer making the 'stop'." CHARLES E.
MOYLAN, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE To BE SECURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 158 (rev. 2d ed. 1979).
93 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Terms like "reasonable suspicion" and "articulable
facts" fall short of providing clear guidance. The essence of these concepts is
that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the detaining law enforcement
officers have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity in
order to stop the suspect. In other words, the whole picture must be taken into
account. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
STeny, 392 U.S. at 29.
95 Id. at 26.
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arrest.9 6 Although the Court noted that any restraint of a
person by a police officer constituted a seizure of the de-
tainee within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,97
it nonetheless affirmed Terry's conviction. The Court re-
jected the argument that a stop-and-frisk search lies
outside the boundaries of those searches subject to
Fourth Amendment constraints, reasoning that a stop-
and-frisk search involved a restraint, although a lesser re-
straint than a traditional search.98 In reaching its decision,
the Court enunciated a new standard, "reasonable suspi-
cion." 99 Satisfying this new standard requires a minimal
level of objective justification. 100
The first case to uphold a Teny type frisk of an individ-
ual at an airport boarding gate on the grounds of match-
ing the hijacker profile and activating the magnetometer
was United States v. Lopez.' 0' Lopez's profile suggested a
substantial likelihood that he was a potential hijacker. He
was frisked by a Federal Marshal after he activated a mag-
netometer and then failed to produce identification. The
patdown resulted in a discovery of heroin. On review, the
- Id. at 15.
97 Id. at 16.
9 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
The Court created a balancing test to articulate the reasonable suspicion
standard:
In order to assess the reasonableness of [the police officer's] con-
duct as a general proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion
upon the constitutionality protected interests of the private citizen,"
for there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion
which the search [or seizure] entails." And in justifying the particu-
lar intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulatable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The scheme of
the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured
that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the
laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
Id. at 20-21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967))
(footnotes omitted).
,o Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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court stressed the compelling governmental interest in
preventing hijackings and the effectiveness of the
search. 0 2 The court reasoned that the Teny standard per-
mits a law enforcement officer to perform a frisk if the of-
ficer believes there is a threat to safety; and thus the court
upheld the legitimacy of the search.10 3
The Terry rationale has also been extended to allow a
brief detention of a person's luggage for a limited investi-
gation, in order to quickly confirm or dispel a suspicion of
illegality. 0 4 In United States v. Place'0 5 a traveler at the
Miami International Airport aroused the suspicion of law
enforcement officers who approached him and requested
both a form of identification and his airline ticket. On the
basis of statements made by the suspect, the agents seized
the passenger's luggage and presented the bags to a
trained narcotics detection dog. The dog's reaction indi-
cated the presence of illegal narcotics and the bag was
held until a search warrant could be obtained. When the
bag was opened, the agents discovered over 1,100 grams
of cocaine.
The Supreme Court reasoned that because the seizure
of luggage "intrudes on both the suspect's possessory
interest in his luggage as well as his liberty interest in pro-
ceeding with his itinerary, '"106 the same standards enunci-
ated in Terry to determine the reasonableness of an
investigative detention of an individual were applicable to
the reasonableness of a limited seizure of an individual's
luggage. 10 7 The Court also made it clear that to comply
with Terry, the detention of luggage must be brief.'08
While the Court has not specified an outside time limit, it
102 Id. at 1097-98.
1o3 Id. at 1098.
-o United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983).
105 Id.
1- Id. at 708.
107 Id. at 708-09. The standard involves determining "whether the officer's ac-
tion was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry, 392
U.S. at 20.
108 "The brevity of the invasion is an important factor in determining whether
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is apparent that detaining luggage for ninety minutes
before submitting the bag to a dog sniff test is per se un-
reasonable; 09 detaining luggage under a Terry stop for 20
minutes may be acceptable." l0
In United States v. Ortiz"'I the United States District
Court for the Central District of California rejected the
government's argument that a search of a passengers lug-
gage met the Terry requirements when no actual stop of
the suspected person occurred, and the suspect's carry-on
luggage was not within the suspect's immediate control
when the search was conducted." t2
On September 7, 1987, at approximately 11 p.m., pas-
sengers Ortiz and Valenzuela approached an American
Airlines ticket agent. They informed the agent that they
held reservations for a 12:15 a.m. flight to Chicago. The
agent issued two one-way tickets, for which Ortiz paid a
total of $970 in cash, and accepted the passengers' two
suitcases. During the agent's conversation with the two
passengers, she noticed that Valenzuela acted extremely
anxious and looked nervously at her and the two suit-
cases. The agent believed that Ortiz and Valenzuela fit the
behavioral profile employed to identify potential hijack-
ers. Believing that the bags might contain a bomb or other
type of material capable of endangering the safety of the
flight, the ticket agent carried the bags to a back room
where she could privately open them without being seen
by the two passengers. The agent placed the two suitcases
on an X-ray machine and observed that the contents of
the first suitcase included two black squares and that the
interior of the second suitcase appeared as a mass of gray
with a black area in the center of the suitcase. The ticket
agent opened the bags, discovering marijuana in the first
suitcase, and a white powdery substance, later determined
the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion."
Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
1- Id. at 710.
110 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
-I 714 F. Supp. 1569 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
112 Id. at 1575.
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to be cocaine, in the second piece of luggage. Ortiz and
Valenzuela were subsequently arrested.
The government argued that the Terry stop-and-frisk
approach should be expanded in Ortiz in two respects.
First, no actual stop of the suspected passengers should
be required before a search of the suitcases began; and
second, the search should not be limited to either the sus-
pects outer clothing or the luggage which the suspects re-
tained dominion over, but should also extend to any
container affiliated with the passengers. 1 3
The court began its analysis by noting that while some
courts had upheld a limited detention of a passenger and
his carry-on luggage to resolve questionable behavior, in
each of these cases, the police officers had stopped the
individual and searched only the carry-on luggage within
the passenger's immediate control." t4 The court opined
that assuming arguendo that Teny could be expanded to
meet the government's request, a balancing of govern-
mental interests justifying the inspection was to be
weighed against the invasion which the search entailed." 15
While the court described the general governmental in-
terests in protecting passengers from hijacking, the perti-
nent inquiry, according to the court, was what were the
specific governmental concerns with respect to the first
suitcase that justified its intrusion and search." 16 The gov-
ernment maintained that these concerns were based on:
(1) Ortiz and Valenzuela purchasing their tickets at "the
last minute"; (2) the fact that the tickets were for one-way
travel; (3) the tickets were paid in full in cash; and (4) the
peculiar behavior of the two passengers.
Even after examining all of the factors taken together
which led to the ticket agent's reasonable suspicion that a
threat to passenger safety existed, the court nevertheless
1I1 Id.
114 Id. (citing United States v. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350, 1352-54 (9th Cir.
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held that these were insufficient to meet the Terry standard
because they " 'describe a very large category of presuma-
bly innocent travelers.' "117 It appears that the court
based its holding on the belief, in part, that the ticket
agent had other options available to her which she failed
to utilize. The court noted, for example, that it would
have been reasonable for the agent to instruct Ortiz and
Valenzuela to carry their luggage to the departure gate
for checking, thus forcing them to either undergo a mag-
netometer search in which they would have impliedly con-
sented to a search," 8 or forego travelling altogether.'
The ticket agent could have also: (1) asked Ortiz and
Valenzuela for photo identification to match their names
with those on the tickets; (2) conducted a hand search of
the checked luggage; (3) waited until Ortiz and
Valenzuela had boarded the aircraft before putting their
luggage on board or; (4) summoned a police officer who
would then have the choice of either requesting consent
to search the suitcases or securing a search warrant if the
officer believed that sufficient evidence existed to indicate
the likely presence of a bomb. 20 These options, the court
held, were simply an application of the Fourth Amend-
ment requirement that the search be no more intrusive
than necessary.'12
Some courts have argued that the Terry doctrine has lit-
tle, if any, application today to airport searches unless
specific articulable facts can establish that reasonable
117 Id. (citing Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)). The court remarked
that:
[p]urchasing tickets which have already been reserved about one
hour and fifteen minutes before the flight is not unusual. Neither
are the facts that the tickets were for one-way travel or that one of
the passengers was nervous before the flight. While most travelers
probably do not pay for their tickets in cash, this fact even in con-
junction with the others, does not establish reasonable suspicion to
believe that Defendants were hijackers.
Id. at 1575-76.
118 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
19 Ortiz, 714 F. Supp. at 1576.
120 Id. at 1577.
121 Id.
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cause exists to believe that an individual is armed and
about to commit a crime. 22 This does not necessarily
mean, however, that Terry is never relevant when assess-
ing a search occurring at an airport.'2
In United States v. Dalpiaz 124 for example, the Sixth Cir-
cuit noted that a person who successfully passed the
screening process may nonetheless, based on facts gath-
ered during that process, present a significant risk if he is
allowed to board a commercial aircraft without further in-
vestigation. 25 If a law enforcement officer justifiably be-
lieves that an individual whom he is investigating at close
range is armed and dangerous, "it would appear to be
clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
necessary measures.., to neutralize the threat of physical
harm." 126 Terry does not require that an officer have ac-
tual certainty that a suspect is armed. 2 7 All that is re-
122 For example, in United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973), the
court held that a Terry approach was inapposite because the agent conducting the
search did not have a particular interest in the passenger as an individual. "There
is no reason to believe that the incidence of concealed weapons is greater among
airline passengers than among members of the public generally, and Terry does
not justify the wholesale 'frisking' of the general pubic in order to locate weapons
and prevent future crimes." Id. at 907-908.
123 LAFAVE, supra note 47, § 10.6(0; see United States v. Homburg, 546 F.2d
1350 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977). In Homburg, a Terry search
was applied when security officers observed a rectangular bulge in the front part
of the defendant's pants which he attempted to conceal with his suitcase. When
the defendant later left a restroom, the bulge was gone and he was carrying his
suitcase normally. Based on Terry, the court determined that the government in-
terest justified the search and balanced the government interest against the inva-
sion which the search entailed. Id. at 1353; see also United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d
666 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 991 (1972).
124 494 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1974).
125 Id. at 377-78. When the defendant in Dalpiaz reached the security check-
point, he handed a security agent a case which contained a gun. After activating a
magnetometer, he was asked to remove all metal objects. Again activating the
alarm a second and third time, a search conducted on the defendant revealed a
walkie-talkie, a hunting knife, six bullets taped together, and an alarm clock. After
the defendant had been cleared to the boarding gate, a police officer asked the
defendant to empty his pockets, producing a projectile simulator which contained
printed instructions stating that if the projectile exploded in close proximity to
humans, it was extremely dangerous. Id. at 375.
126 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
127 Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d at 378.
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quired is that a prudent person believes that he, or others,
are in danger. 128
C. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH
A second approach taken to justify airport searches is
the administrative search. The Supreme Court has ad-
dressed searches conducted for purposes other than crim-
inal law enforcement that might invade areas protected by
the Fourth Amendment. In 1967, the Supreme Court
enunciated the administrative search doctrine in a pair of
companion cases: Camara v. Municipal Court 329 and See v.
City of Seattle.13 0 In Camara, the Court reasoned that an ad-
ministrative search was permissible under the Fourth
Amendment "by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails."1 3 1 In articulating the
new administrative search doctrine, the Court redefined
the traditional probable cause standard. Individualized
suspicion was replaced with a more expansive concept of
reasonableness, cast in the form of a balancing test.13 2
This reasonableness "must be as limited in its intrusive-
ness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative
need that justifies it.' 33 Administrative searches gener-
ally satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness re-
quirements because the searches are not personal in
nature, are not directed toward discovering evidence of a
crime, t 34 and thus involve a relatively limited invasion of
privacy. '3 5
Airport security screenings have consistently been
upheld as a consensual regulatory search to further an
administratively directed program whose goal is to ensure
128 Id.
129 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
1so 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
13, Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
132 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973).
133 Id. at 908.
14 Id.
13- Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
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air safety. 3 6 In the seminal case of United States v. Davis '3 7
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals approved warrantless
airport security checks of all passengers and their carry-on
luggage as administrative searches. 38 According to the
court, administrative searches are constitutionally permis-
sible without a warrant if the intrusion is consistent with
satisfying the administrative need. 3 9 A warrantless ad-
ministrative search is also legitimate when requiring a
search warrant would frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search.140
The administrative search, however, does not extend to
checked luggage. The FAA has mandated that commercial
air carriers confront only the hijacking risk posed by
checked luggage on a passenger-by-passenger basis.
116 See, e.g., United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir.
1989); United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773 (11 th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th
Cir. 1973).
137 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
138 Id. at 908.
Screening searches of airline passengers are conducted as part of a
general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative pur-
pose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives
aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings. The essential
purpose of the scheme is not to detect weapons or explosives or to
apprehend those who carry them, but to deter persons carrying such
material from seeking to board at all.
Id.
For cases where nonconsensual warrantless searches without individualized sus-
picion or probable cause have been constitutionally upheld in furtherance of a
regulatory program designed to advance a government policy, see National Treas-
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding warrantless
drug testing of employees of the U.S. Customs Service seeking either transfers or
promotions to sensitive positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n.,
489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding safety regulations of the Federal Railroad Admin-
istration for alcohol and drug testing, without either a warrant or individualized
suspicion of any worker involved in a train accident which resulted in property
damage, injury, or death); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
(upholding stopping motorists at border patrol checkpoints for questioning con-
cerning residence status); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (uphold-
ing warrantless and routine check of firearm dealer's storeroom, pursuant to
procedures authorized by Gun Control Act of 1968); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971) (upholding scheduled home visit by caseworker under State Aid to
Families With Dependent Children Program).
139 Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
140 Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
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When a passenger meets the hijacker profile, airlines can
satisfy the FAA requirement by demanding photo identi-
fication to match the passenger to his ticket and luggage
stubs, by loading the luggage on the aircraft after the sus-
pect has already boarded, or by inspecting the luggage.
Thus, because a search of checked luggage is triggered by
individual suspicion, it cannot be rationalized as an ad-
ministrative search.14
Administrative searches are to be utilized only for the
specific regulatory purposes for which they were contem-
plated. 14 2 If used for purposes outside the administrative
scheme, they may fall beyond the rationale which justified
their approval. Legitimate fear exists that screening pas-
sengers and their carry-on luggage for weapons or explo-
sives might be subverted into a general search for
evidence of crime, thus providing law enforcement of-
ficers with a mechanism to circumvent the customary
guidelines of the Fourth Amendment. 43 The Davis court
noted that if this were to occur, a court would have to ex-
clude the evidence. 44 Nevertheless, the court in Davis
maintained that the governmental interest in assuring air
safety was compelling and and outweighed the competing
privacy interests of travelers. 45
United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency 146 provides an il-
lustration of an administrative search that exceeded its
limited purpose. 4 7 U.S. Currency involved the United
States Customs Service officials' policy at the Seattle air-
port under which Customs would pay a $250 reward to
any baggage screener who discovered and reported any
141 Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
42 Id. at 910-11.
10' Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230 (1960).
'44 Davis, 482 F.2d at 909. However, in Abel, the Supreme Court stated that
when conducting a justified administrative search, if an officer uncovers contra-
band completely unrelated to the purpose for which the administrative search was
conducted, that contraband can be used against the defendant in court. Abel, 362
U.S. at 241.
115 Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
146 873 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1989).
147 Id. at 1245.
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sum of U.S. currency exceeding $ 10,000.I48 During a rou-
tine screening, a security officer discovered $130,000 in
cash in a passenger's briefcase and promptly notified Cus-
toms agents who paid the officer for the tip. Later, after
the passenger had deplaned and retrieved his luggage in
Los Angeles, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents stopped the passenger and detained his suitcase.
While no formal arrest was made, the DEA made it known
to the passenger that should he refuse to open his brief-
case, the agents would attempt to obtain a search warrant.
The passenger opened the briefcase, revealing bundles of
currency in various denominations and a substantial
quantity of cigarette rolling papers.' 49 The agents kept
the currency and returned the papers after photocopying
them.
The court noted that the officers had very broad discre-
tion in determining the extent of their search for weapons
or explosives. 50 If, while searching, the officers have only
one objective, such as detecting firearms, an administra-
tive search is appropriate, and a court will defer to the
officer's judgment since an officer's only motive to open a
package is the belief that it contained something poten-
tially hazardous.' 5' In this case, however, the court held
that because the officers had a dual purpose in searching
passengers both searching for explosives and for large
amounts of currency, the searches were more intrusive
than necessary. 52 The searches would have been accepta-
148 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) governing civil forfeitures. It provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States
and no property right shall exist in them: (6) All moneys, negotiable
instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or in-
tended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance.
ld.
I1 The next day Smoky, a narcotics-detecting dog, was used to test the cur-
rency for the odor of illicit drugs. Smoky's reaction indicated that cocaine, heroin,
or marijuana had come in contact with the bills. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d
at 1242.
so Id. at 1245.
'5' Id.
1-52 Id. at 1247. A dual search "effectively transforms a limited check for weap-
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ble if they had focused on air safety alone. 5 3 Airport x-ray
searches thus constitute an administrative exception to
the warrant requirement only if the search is conducted to
further a compelling administrative purpose, such as
preventing weapons and other dangerous items from be-
ing smuggled onto aircrafts.'5 4
As noted, ensuring that criminal investigations are not
based upon the findings of an administrative search is a
great concern.' 5 - When a court approves a warrantless
administrative search, it is, in effect, granting approval for
a search of an entire class of similar situations. 156 Thus,
courts must often examine the legislative history and facts
applicable to an entire class of cases, not simply those ad-
judicative facts which are applicable solely to those cases
before the court. 157 Courts must then rely on the legisla-
tive intent to determine that the intrusion serves a "nar-
row but compelling administrative objective."'5 8
The Colorado Supreme Court recently decided a case
that is typical of the approach taken today of airport
searches pursuant to administrative and regulatory pro-
grams. In People v. Heimel1'9 Heimel was charged with un-
lawful possession of illegal drugs seized during a
warrantless search of a small bag at the Colorado Springs
Municipal Airport. Heimel presented himself at a clearly
marked checkpoint station for security screening. The se-
ons and explosives into a general search for evidence of crime. This substantially
erodes the privacy rights of passengers who travel through the system .... A lim-
ited administrative search cannot... serve unrelated law enforcement purposes."
Id.
153 Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
154 Id.
155 Abel, 362 U.S. at 229. According to Abel, the evidence derived through a
search based on an administrative warrant for deportation is admissible, but the
Supreme Court noted that its opinion would have been different if "the adminis-
trative warrant was here employed as an instrument of criminal law enforcement
to circumvent the latter's legal restrictions, rather than as a bona fide preliminary
step in a deportation proceeding." Id. at 230.
156 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1244.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 812 P.2d 1177 (Colo. 1991).
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curity program at the airport required that all potential
passengers present themselves at a checkpoint and pass
through a magnetometer to gain access to the sterile area
of the airport. Although Heimel passed through the mag-
netometer without activating the signal, the security agent
attempted, unsuccessfully, to inspect a small carry-on bag
that the defendant had strapped around his waist. After
refusing to be searched, Heimel withdrew to a nearby
waiting room. When a police officer approached Heimel,
the officer noted that he was acting nervous and was pac-
ing. The officer informed Heimel that he had to check the
defendant for a weapon, and after taking Heimel back to
the airport security office, the officer conducted a search
of the bag, discovering eight clear bags of dried
mushrooms. 160
The trial court ruled that there was no probable cause
for the search of the bag, and the most that the officer
could do was to feel the outside of the bag for a weapon,
in order to ensure his safety during the temporary deten-
tion.' 6' The court distinguished previous airport security
search cases by maintaining that those searches involved
individuals who were attempting to board an airplane,
while in Heimel's case, he had already voluntarily left the
sterile area of the airport and could not have possibly
smuggled a weapon onto an airplane. 62
The Colorado Supreme Court initially determined that
the search was part of an administrative regulatory ap-
proach in furtherance of a program directed at preventing
air piracy and ensuring the safety of the travelling public,
and thus found that the nonconsensual warrantless search
was constitutional. 63 The court stressed the need for
flexibility for airport security personnel in their effort to
determine whether someone who has presented himself at
-6 A field test and laboratory analysis of the mushrooms proved positive for
psilocybin, a schedule I controlled substance. Id. at 1179-80.
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a checkpoint is carrying a weapon or explosive sub-
stance.' 6 Physical searches of carry-on items are, there-
fore, appropriate when the "purpose of the search is to
allay any apprehension of a security risk occasioned by the
inconclusive nature of other screening procedures."'165
This is true even when the search is conducted outside of
the sterile area, and after the individual has presented
himself for inspection. 66
A potentially disturbing extension of the administrative
search doctrine developed in United States v. Maldonado-Es-
pinosa. 67 In Maldonado-Espinosa, the U.S. District Court
for Puerto Rico announced, in dicta, that if an administra-
tive search program was already currently in place and
sanctioned by the courts as being necessary, then it was
the "heartfelt conviction of this court that ... the lower-
ing of privacy expectations resultant from that procedure
should justify general, non administrative searches of per-
sons and personal effects already subject to the adminis-
trative search."' 6  The court reasoned that when most
people pack their bags for a flight, they expect that their
- Heimel, 812 P.2d at 1181.
165 Id.
-" Id. See also United States v. Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d 776, 778-80 (11 th Cir.
1985); United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 777-78 (11 th Cir. 1984).
167 767 F. Supp. 1176 (D. P.R. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1992),petition
for cert. filed, 61 U.S. L.W. 3491 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1993). In Maldonado-Espinosa, after a
warrantless search, a brother and sister were charged with possession with intent
to distribute sixty kilograms of cocaine discovered in two hard-shell suitcases
which they checked aboard an American Airlines flight from San Juan, Puerto
Rico to Miami.
The search was triggered by a dog sniff of the defendants' luggage. While a
passenger possesses a privacy interest in personal luggage, to a trained narcotics
dog has been held not to constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109 (1984) (affirming Place holding that a dog sniff is not a search); United States
v. Germonsen-Garcia, 712 F. Supp. 862 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding that canine sniff
of luggage at airport was not a search); United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929
F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 868 (1992) (concluding that a dog
sniff of automobile was not a search); United States v. La France, 879 F.2d 1 (1 st
Cir. 1989) (holding that a canine sniff of Federal Express Package does not consti-
tute a search).
' Maldonado-Espinosa, 767 F. Supp. at 1187.
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bags may be opened to public view once at the airport.169
It appeared to the court:
pure abstraction to assert that a person retains a 'privacy
interest' in a bag as to one type of search, but not another.
Once the interior of luggage must be opened to scrutiny
for the administrative purpose, the privacy interest in the
contents as therein packed seems to us irrevocably lost.'7 °
While the court did not advocate the position that posi-
tive evidence of a crime derived from a warrantless x-ray
would justify a complete warrantless search, it did main-
tain that this would constitute the probable cause neces-
sary to hold the luggage and obtain a warrant.' 7 ' If courts
were able to carefully monitor areas where administrative
searches were applied, and were also certain that the po-
lice did not abuse their discretion, then the areas in which
administrative searches lowered privacy interests would
not expand.72 Privacy expectations, "once lowered by le-
gitimately required administrative searches, [would] not
suddenly regain because a new searcher approache[d] the
luggage with a different purpose."' 7 3
D. BORDER SEARCHES
The third exception to the warrant requirement is the
border search. At the nation's border, all that is required
to justify a search for purposes of customs law enforce-
ment is unsupported, or mere, suspicion. 74 Routine
searches, moreover, are not subject to any requirement of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.' 75 Numerous




172 Maldonado-Espinosa, 767 F. Supp. at 1188.
173 Id.
74 Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
977 (1966). For example, automobile travelers may be stopped at fixed check-
points near a border without individualized suspicion, even if the stop is based
predominantly on ethnicity. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563
(1976).
175 United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
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based on their special character, and are thus analogous
to national borders. 76
Since 1789, custom officials have had the authority to
conduct warrantless searches without probable cause. 77
This authority was based on the need to regulate the col-
lection of duties and to prevent contraband from being
brought into the Republic. 78  Routine border searches
have also had a lengthy history of judicial acceptance. In
1886, the Supreme Court held that because the border
search exception was passed by the first Congress and
preceded the Bill of Rights by two months, border
searches were not intended to be included within the pro-
hibition of the Fourth Amendment. 79
Courts have upheld airport searches by analogizing
them to border searches, determining that the objective in
each case is the discovery of contraband rather than the
detection of past criminal activity. 180 The Supreme Court
has noted that not only is the expectation of privacy less at
'76 United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840
(1973). In Moreno, the court stated why it considered airport boarding areas simi-
lar to national borders:
[Boarding areas are] the one channel through which all hijackers
must pass before being in a position to commit their crime. It is also
the one point where airport security officials can marshal their re-
sources to thwart such acts before the lives of an airplane's passen-
gers and crew are endangered.
Id. at 51; see also United States v. Lopez-Pages,. 767 F.2d 776, 778 (1 1th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 775 (11 th Cir. 1984).
77 Act ofJuly 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43.
178 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977). For a general discus-
sion of border searches, see Judith B. Ittig, The Rites of Passage: Border Searches and
the Fourth Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REV. 329 (1973); Gary C. Robb, Warrantless
Border Searches: Crossing the Boundary of Unreasonableness, 19 S. TExAs L.J. 265
(1978); Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007
(1968).
- "[I]t is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and
seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable,' and that they are not embraced within the
prohibition of the [Fourth] Amendment." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
623 (1886); see also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (concluding that
the "longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable
cause and without a warrant are nonetheless 'reasonable' has a history as old as
the Fourth Amendment itself").
180 McGinley & Down, supra note 38, at 323 n.196. (quoting Note, Airport Secur-
ity Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1039, 1050-51 (1971)).
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the border than it is in the interior of the country,'' but
the Fourth Amendment balance between the competing
interests of the government and the privacy rights of indi-
viduals is struck more favorably toward the government at
the border. 8 2 However, this does not mean that the po-
tential for abuse of individual liberty does not exist.'" 5
In United States v. Skipwith ,84 the Fifth Circuit addressed
the question of whether an airport security search con-
ducted at the boarding gate violated a passenger's Fourth
Amendment rights. Skipwith appeared at his boarding
gate at the airport, and because he met the FAA anti-
skyjacking profile and claimed that he was not carrying
any form of identification, a deputy United States marshal
detained him for questioning. While questioning Skip-
with, the marshal inquired whether a billfold-shaped
bulge in Skipwith's left rear pocket was caused by a wallet,
and if so, whether the wallet contained any identification.
Immediately thereafter, Skipwith admitted that his name
was different than the name he originally gave to the mar-
shal. Skipwith was escorted to a private airport security
office and on the way to the office, another deputy mar-
shal noticed a bulge in the Skipwith's front trouser pocket
which he believed was a gun. Once in the office, the secur-
ity officers required Skipwith to empty his pockets, re-
vealing cocaine.
The Skipwith court held that in order to determine the
reasonableness of a search, courts must weigh more than
the necessity of the search in relation to potential harm to
the public. 8 5 The effectiveness of the search procedure
in averting potential harm must be balanced with the "de-
gree and nature of intrusion into the privacy of the person
18, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
182 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540.
18- "Many border searches carry grave potential for 'arbitrary and oppressive
interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of in-
dividuals.' " Id. at 556 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554
(1976)).
"8 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
185 Id. at 1275.
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and effects of the citizen which the search entails."'' 8 6 The
court concluded that the standard for initiating a search of
a person at the boarding gate should not be more strin-
gent than the standard applied in border crossing situa-
tions. 87 Individuals who present themselves for boarding
on an air carrier are similar to those seeking entrance into
the country, and therefore are subject to a search based
on mere, or unsupported suspicion.'i 8 Thus, reasonable-
ness does not require that law enforcement officers search
only those passengers who appear nervous or suspicious
or meet a hijacker's profile.
Within the border search exception for searches con-
ducted at airports, courts have distinguished between
searches conducted in secured boarding areas and those
searches taking place in undefined remote zones in air-
ports. 8 9 When a passenger enters a restricted zone at an
airport, such as the boarding gate area, that passenger
may be stopped and searched if there is a mere suspicion
of possible illegal activity.' 90 If, however, an individual is
in the general airport area and has not consented to being
searched, a case-by-case application of the reasonableness
standard is utilized and police officers must have reason-
able suspicion that the law is being violated before engag-
ing in a search.' 9 This distinction attempts to protect the
travelling public by assuring that the "net can sweep no
wider than necessary since the broad right to search is
limited to the last possible point in time and space which
186 Id.
187 Id. at 1276.
188 "[T]he standards for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate
should be no more stringent than those applied in border crossing situations." Id.
For other cases where the courts have adopted the view that airports are similar to
border crossings and, therefore, different for Fourth Amendment purposes, see
United States v. Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d 776 (11 th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Caminos, 770 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 979 (1973); United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 840 (1973).
189 Skipworth, 482 F.2d at 1276.
o United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1973).
19, Moreno, 475 F.2d at 51.
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could protect the aircraft, the boarding gate."' 9 2
A unique argument proffered by the government in
Maldonado-Espinosa was that a warrantless airport search
could be justified in the context of a "checkpoint" exami-
nation at border crossings. Under this approach, a border
patrol maintains a permanent checkpoint on roads and
bridges leading from the border at which a vehicle may be
detained and briefly questioned. Custom officials may
stop a car even if they do not have a legitimate reason to
believe that the vehicle contains illegal aliens.' 9 3 Check-
point searches, additionally, do not require showing that a
person or luggage actually has crossed the border.
194
The court in Maldonado-Espinosa, however, rejected the
government's argument, proclaiming instead that a per-
missible search and seizure is more restricted in a check-
point situation than in other border cases.' 95 The only
right the checkpoint approach gives the border patrol is
the "right to make stops and inquiries without any partic-
ularized suspicion at a point away from the border where
they would ordinarily be prevented from doing so. '
It is clear from Maldonado-Espinosa that while the check-
point rationale admirably serves as a justification for a
general screening for border purposes even without a sus-
picion that there was an illegal border crossing, the check-
point theory cannot justify a warrantless luggage search in
an airport. This reasoning is generally sound. If prob-
able cause to search exists based on the outcome of stop-
ping a traveler and his luggage in an airport, the custom
official is in the same position as if probable cause had
come about during a standard highway violation stop else-
where in the interior of the country.
97
192 Shipworth, 483 F.2d at 1276-77.
193 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 587 (1983).
'- Jasinski v. Adams, 781 F.2d 843, 847 (1lth Cir. 1986).
195 Maldonado-Espinosa, 767 F. Supp. at 1183.
196 Id.
197 See California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991) (holding that police officers
who attempt to search luggage in an airport cannot rely on the exigent circum-
stance exception to the warrant requirement for an automobile search).
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E. EXPRESS AND IMPLIED CONSENT
The final exception to the warrant requirement ad-
vanced by many courts considering the constitutionality
of airport searches is a search based on either express or
implied consent. An airport security search may be justi-
fied since Fourth Amendment rights are waivable by con-
sent provided that the individual's consent is freely and
voluntarily given, and not the result of coercion or duress,
actual or implied.19 8 Efforts to obtain an individual's con-
sent are most common when probable cause is nonexis-
tent and thus a search warrant could not be obtained. 99
Before the United States Supreme Court decision in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,20 0 consent was judged as a waiver
of a known right or was simply viewed as an inquiry of
voluntariness. 20 ' In Schneckloth, the Court held that the
question of whether consent was freely and voluntarily
given was to be determined from the totality of the cir-
cumstances.2 °2 In determining voluntariness, "two com-
peting concerns must be accommodated . . . the
legitimate need for such searches and the equally impor-
tant requirement of assuring the absence of coercion. "203
Subtly coercive police interrogations and the vulnerable
state of those individuals who consent to a search are fac-
tors to consider in determining whether consent was vol-
204
untarily given.
log Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968).
- LAFAVE, supra note 47, § 8.1.
-00 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth, an officer stopped a car because one of
its headlights and license plate light were burned out. After it was determined by
the officer that the driver had no license and that only one of the five passengers
had identification, the officer asked the passenger whose brother owned the car
for permission to search the automobile. The passenger gave permission, and
during the search, three checks that had been stolen from a car wash were discov-
ered wadded up under the left rear seat. The checks became evidence and the
passenger was convicted. Id. at 220.
201 See LAFAVE, supra note 47, § 8.1(a) for an in-depth discussion of the differ-
ences between waiver and voluntariness.
202 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
203 Id.
2 Id. at 229.
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In United States v. Davis2 ' 5 the Ninth Circuit held that a
pre-boarding search was not unlawful if there was implied
consent, the search was reasonable, and the passenger
had the right to leave the boarding area without being
subject to the search. 20 6 A passenger impliedly consents
to a search by electing to proceed to the boarding gate, a
place at which that passenger knows or should know that
he is subject to being searched.2 °7
The Ninth Circuit responded to the proliferation of air
piracy and terrorism which grew after the Davis decision.
In United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo,2 ° s the court held that
when a passenger places his luggage on an x-ray
machine's conveyor belt at a secured boarding area for
the purpose of travelling, that person has impliedly con-
sented to both a visual inspection and a limited hand
search of the luggage if the x-ray did not positively deter-
mine that the luggage did not contain a weapon. Given
the slight privacy intrusion and the negligible social
stigma arising from the manner in which such a search is
conducted, the court reasoned that a free society was will-
ing to tolerate these searches, provided that they were
not conducted "in order to uncover other types of
contraband."209
The Pulido court also addressed the Davis requirement
of allowing a passenger to avoid a search by choosing not
to fly.21 0 The court held that a rule which allowed a pas-
senger to leave the boarding area after an x-ray scan was
20- 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
2 6 Id. at 912-914.
7 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276-77.
208 800 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986). Pulido-Bacquerizo involved a defendant who
placed two briefcases onto an x-ray machine's conveyer belt. A security agent
believed that a dark object in one of the briefcases might be a bomb. After a
second agent thought that he spotted wires which might indicate a bomb or other
explosive device, the agents decided to run the briefcase through the x-ray
machine a second time. After the second x-ray failed to identify the object, a vis-
ual inspection and hand search uncovered over 2,100 grams of cocaine. Id. at
900-01.
2-9 Id. at 902.
210 Id. The court relied on United States v. DeAngelo, 584 F.2d 46, 47-48 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979), for the proposition that allowing a
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inconclusive would, in effect, encourage airline terrorism
and air piracy by providing a secure exit when detection
was threatened.' Thus, if a passenger does not wish to
be searched, he must choose not to fly before he places
his luggage on a x-ray machine's conveyor belt.21 2
If an airline passenger believes that law enforcement of-
ficers are prepared to discover illegal contraband stashed
in his suitcase, he might attempt to abandon or disclaim
ownership of the bag.213 An issue then would arise
whether his disclaimer of ownership of the luggage di-
vests him from any Fourth Amendment protection of pri-
vacy interest and whether that disclaimer constitutes his
consent to a warrantless search.
In United States v. Miller2 4 DEA agents seized four
pieces of luggage from the defendant's car and asked him
for his consent to a search of the luggage. The defendant
denied both ownership and knowledge of the suitcases.
While maintaining that he was not the owner of one of the
bags, the defendant did agree to open a locked bag, re-
vealing drugs. The court held that the disclaimer of own-
ership of the suitcase coupled with the unlocking of the
suitcase constituted consent-in-fact to a search. 5
The abandonment issue has been extended to airport
searches. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for exam-
ple, determined in United States v. Tolbert 2 16 that a woman
defendant to remove his luggage when an x-ray raised suspicion would frustrate
the government's attempt to combat terrorism. Pulido-Bacquerizo, 800 F.2d at 902.
211 Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d at 902.
212 Id. A potential passenger who has not consented to a search has the right to
refuse an airport security search by leaving a checkpoint area at any time prior to
the commencement of the screening process. Bostick, 11l S.Ct. at 2387-88.
213 The term "abandon" here does not refer to its traditional definition in prop-
erty law. Abandonment in this context involves the Fourth Amendment and the
"capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a
property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the in-
vaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
214 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979).
215 Id. at 1131. The First Circuit explained that "one who disclaims any interest
in luggage thereby disclaims any concern about whether or not the contents of the
luggage remain private." Id.
216 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983).
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who had purchased her ticket with cash only twenty min-
utes prior to takeoff, who was traveling under an assumed
name, who insisted that she was travelling without lug-
gage, and who specifically denied ownership of a bag
could not assert that she " 'exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy' respecting the luggage. "217
Based on her actions and vigorous oral disclaimers, the
court maintained that the defendant had no interest in
preserving the secrecy of the contents of her luggage and
had no legitimate expectation of privacy.21 8 Thus, a war-
rantless search did not violate her Fourth Amendment
rights.21 9
IV. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT
A. HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Electronic surveillance can serve as an effective mecha-
nism to prevent the spread of terrorism, including air
piracy and other crimes targeted against air carriers. The
use of electronic surveillance for security reasons ex-
panded during World War II and continued after the end
of fighting in 1945.220
The Supreme Court first addressed Fourth Amendment
concerns raised by wiretapping in Olmstead v. United
States.22' Despite a sharply divided Court, the five justice
majority followed the traditional "trespass" doctrine,
maintaining that a physical search of property or home
must occur before there was a violation of the Fourth




220 In 1940, after the Senate rejected a House resolution granting the FBI au-
thority to conduct electronic surveillance for national security purposes, President
Roosevelt, acting. alone, granted Attorney General Jackson the power to use lis-
tening devices when dangerous matters "involving defense of the nation" were
involved. Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Wali (And Wires) Have Ears: The Back-
ground and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 793, 798 (1989).
221 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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Amendment.22 2 Forty years later, Olmstead was reversed
by the Court in Katz v. United States. 223 In Katz, FBI agents
installed a wiretap on the outside of a public telephone
without a warrant to do so. Although there was no physi-
cal trespass, the Court stated that "the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places. 224 Fourth Amendment
guarantees thus protect against illegal searches and
seizures conducted without an actual physical intrusion
into one's property.22 5 In a famous footnote in Katz, the
Supreme Court proclaimed that it had no opinion
concerning the use of wiretaps for national security
purposes. 26
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the is-
sue of warrantless physical searches or electronic surveil-
lance to collect foreign intelligence information.2 7 Prior
to the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) in 1978,228 it was fairly well established by
lower courts that a foreign intelligence exception to the
Fourth Amendment existed and that the President had
the inherent power to conduct warrantless electronic sur-
veillance in the area of foreign intelligence collection. 9
This power constituted an exception to the general
222 Id. at 466.
223 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
224 Id. at 351.
225 Id. at 353.
226 Id. at 358 n.23.
227 Justice Byron White's concurrence in Katz suggested that a warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance for national security purposes would be reasonable pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment if either the President or the Attorney General authorized
the surveillance for security purposes. Id. at 364. This view was rejected by Jus-
tices William 0. Douglas and William Brennan as "a wholly unwarranted green
light for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a
warrant in cases in which the Executive Branch itself labels 'national security' mat-
ters." Id. at 359.
228 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988).
229 See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied sub. nom., Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United
Stats v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). But
see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976).
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requirement for a search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment." 0
When domestic security concerns are involved, how-
ever, the President does not have unrestrained discretion
under the Fourth Amendment to decide when surveil-
lance will be initiated.23 ' In United States v. United States
District Court (known as the Keith case), the Supreme Court
held that wiretaps conducted for domestic purposes vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment unless prior judicial ap-
proval had been obtained before the surveillance was
conducted. 3 2 Under Keith, a search warrant is required
for domestic intelligence gathering, but the surveillance
may be entitled to different and more flexible standards of
probable cause due to practical considerations.2 3 3  The
test to ascertain whether a warrant is necessary involves
balancing the question of whether the "needs of citizens
for privacy and free expression may not be better pro-
tected by requiring a warrant" with the issue of "whether
a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts
of [the] Government .... Balancing the needs of the
2- United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72 (9th Cir. 1984).
231 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972).
232 Id. at 322. Keith arose from a criminal proceeding in which the United States
charged three defendants with conspiracy to destroy government property, in-
cluding the dynamite bombing of a Cental Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office in
Ann Arbor, Michigan.
The defendants made a pretrial motion for disclosure of electronic surveillance
information. The government argued that despite the warrantless nature of the
surveillance, they were nonetheless lawful because they constituted a reasonable
exercise of presidential power needed to protect national security.
The government based its argument on Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988), which recognized the con-
stitutionally granted authority of the executive to conduct domestic security sur-
veillance without a warrant. The Court rejected this argument and held that the
government's responsibility to safeguard domestic security had to be weighed
against the potential for abuse of individual privacy. Id. at 322-23. These free-
doms can not remain if domestic security surveillance are conducted only within
the discretion of the Executive branch without judicial approval. Id. at 320.
23- Id. at 322. "[D]omestic security surveillance may involve different policy and
practical considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime.' The gathering
of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of vari-
ous sources .... The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to
identify ...." Id.
23 Id. at 315.
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government and individual privacy rights, the Court de-
termined in Keith that the executive must seek a warrant
before it undertakes domestic security surveillance. 35
Against this historical backdrop, Congress enacted
FISA to establish guidelines for the utilization of elec-
tronic surveillance in acquiring foreign intelligence infor-
mation which can be applied to prevent the spread of air
piracy.236 FISA was the fifth effort by Congress in the past
20 years to enact guidelines for gathering foreign in-
telligence via electronic eavesdropping. 3 7 During the
legislative debate, there was great concern that the gov-
ernment's legitimate interest in securing intelligence in-
formation did not conflict with an individual's interest in
freedom from excessive government intrusion.2 38 The
congressional goal was to create a stable framework
within which the President could conduct legitimate elec-
tronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
within the context of the nation's commitment to privacy
and individual rights.2 39
Numerous court decisions have concluded that FISA
satisfies the constraints the Fourth Amendment places on
foreign intelligence surveillance conducted by the govern-
ment. 240 The Fourth Amendment requirement of prob-
able cause when a surveillance is conducted pursuant to
national security concerns is not necessarily analogous to
255 Id. at 320.
236 In re Kevork, 788 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1986).
237 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); National Security Act of 1975, S. 743, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Free-
dom from Surveillance Act of 1974, S. 4062, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974); Surveil-
lance Practices and Procedures Act of 1973, S. 2820, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
238 S. Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 3916.
239 S. Rep. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3973, 3979-80. The FISA was meant to take into account"[t]he difference be-
tween ordinary criminal investigations to gather evidence of specific crimes and
foreign intelligence investigations to uncover and monitor clandestine activities."
Id. at 3983.
240 See, e.g., United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72-74 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Kevork, 788 F.2d
566, 571 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1185-1192
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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the individualized suspicion standard applied in criminal
investigations.2 4 ' The warrant application may vary de-
pending on the governmental interest to be enforced and
the character of citizen rights deserving protection.242
While criminal warrants require probable cause, FISA re-
quires no showing of criminal activity on the part of the
suspect, unless the wiretap is directed toward intercepting
the communications of a "United States person. ' 243 In
Keith, the Supreme Court maintained that the probable
cause requirement was to be read against the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard. 244
FISA allows a federal officer acting on the President's
behalf, with the approval of the Attorney General, to ob-
tain from either a judge or a specially created FISA
court, 245 an order sanctioning electronic surveillance of
either a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power for
241 United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322
(1972). The Court remarked that "[d]ifferent standards [of probable cause] may
be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if [it is] reasonable both in relation to
the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected
rights of our citizens." Id. at 322-23.
242 Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 790.
243 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (1988). If the target of the wiretap is a United
Stats person, FISA requires a showing of probable cause that the target is en-
gaged in activity which "may involve" a criminal violation. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A)-
(B). The government is also required to demonstrate that the person is knowingly
engaged in or is aiding a foreign power in terrorist activities or intelligence gath-
ering. Id.
244 Keith, 407 U.S. at 323.
245 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) rules on ex parte in cam-
era applications for warrants. The FISC is comprised of seven district court judges
from seven different United States judicial circuits who are designated by the
ChiefJustice of the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (1988). Each judge serves
a seven year term with no possibility of reappointment by the Chief Justice. Id.
All applications to the FISC must first be approved by the Attorney General. Id.
§§ 1804(a), 1805(a)(2). If a warrant is denied, the government may appeal the
decision to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, comprised of
three federal appeals court judges. Id. § 1803(b). If the reviewing judge finds
that certain conditions, including probable cause to believe that the target of the
potential surveillance is either a foreign power, have been met, then the judge will
issue a surveillance order. Id. § 1804.
One observer described the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts as "most
certainly the strangest creation in the history of the federal Judiciary." JAMES
BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY
368 (1982).
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the purpose of obtaining intelligence information.2 46 The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was ex-
pressly created by Congress to serve as a counterbalance
to the Executive's power to direct electronic foreign intel-
ligence surveillance. 47
FISA contains definitions of "foreign power" and
"agent of foreign power" that are relevant when discuss-
ing the prevention of air piracy on American air carriers
or terroristic activities directed against these carriers.
FISA defines "foreign power" to include "a group en-
gaged in international terrorism or activities in prepara-
tion therefor. 2 48 "Agent of a foreign power" is defined
to include any person who either knowingly participates
in sabotage or international terrorism," or knowingly par-
ticipates in activities that are in preparation therefor. 249
"International terrorism" also includes "violent acts or
acts dangerous to human life" that either violate the crim-
inal laws of the United States or would violate criminal
laws if these acts were committed within the jurisdictional
boundaries of the United States.2 5 ° International terror-
ism further includes any activities that appear to be in-
tended to either "intimidate or coerce the civilian
population."125' Finally, "foreign intelligence informa-
tion" relates to information that concerns the ability of
the United States government to protect against "acts of
international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of
a foreign power. "252
Relying on the wide definitions of "foreign power,"
"agent of foreign power," and "foreign intelligence," the
government can prosecute defendants in United States
courts for engaging in hijacking or air terrorism. Thus,
246 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (1988).
247 S. REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 3917.
248 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (1988).
249 Id. § 1801(b)(2)(C).
2-0 Id. § 1801(c)(1).
253 Id. § 1801(2).
252 Id. § 1801(e)(1)(B).
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obtaining a warrant pursuant to FISA would offer another
method to investigate suspected hijackers without the
traditional constraints of the Fourth Amendment as ap-
plied to airport searches.
FISA distinguishes between a "United States person"
and a "non-United States person," and affords greater
protection under the Act to a United States person. 53 A
United States person is either a United States citizen, a
permanent resident alien, an unincorporated group com-
posed of a substantial number of citizens or lawfully ad-
mitted aliens, or a United States corporation. 54 A United
States person can be an agent of a foreign power if he
participates in criminal acts relating to terrorist opera-
tions on behalf of a foreign power. 55
B. APPLICABILITY OF FISA TO COMMERCIAL AIR TRAVEL
The Government applied FISA to convict terrorists of
transporting explosive materials on a commercial flight in
United States v. Sarkissian.258 Sarkissian concerned the FBI's
attempt to prevent Armenian terrorists from bombing the
Honorary Turkish Consulate in Philadelphia. In Septem-
ber, 1982, the FBI obtained authorization from the FISC
to place a wiretap on the telephone in Santa Monica, Cali-
fornia of one of the three suspects who were terrorist de-
fendants. The FBI concluded, through electronic
eavesdropping, that the defendants were assembling a
bomb, and planned to transport the bomb from Los An-
geles to Boston on either a TWA or Northwest Orient
flight. After determining the date and flight of the sus-
pected terrorists, the FBI assembled a command post of
50 agents at Logan Airport in Boston, and established a
search procedure that included both a dog sniff and an x-
ray scan. An FBI agent ran the fifty-seven pieces of lug-
253 If the subject of the wiretap is a "United States persons,"the FISC judge
must find that all statements and certifications required by section 1804(a)(7)(E)
are not clearly erroneous. Id. § 1805(a).
2- Id. § 1801(i).
235 Id. § 1801(b), 1805(a)(3).
2- 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988).
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gage unloaded from the flight through the x-ray scanner
and detected components of a bomb. After opening the
suitcase, the agent found an unassembled bomb and five
sticks of dynamite, and the FBI later arrested the suspects.
The Sarkissian court addressed two issues relating to
Fourth Amendment concerns. The first concern was
whether exigent circumstances existed that allowed a
search of the suitcase absent a warrant. 57 Exigent cir-
cumstances supported by probable cause are required for
a warrantless search of luggage. 2 " These circumstances
include those that would cause an ordinarily reasonable
person to believe that timely action or entry was necessary
to prevent harm to police officers or others.259
The court determined that the FBI knew that a bomb or
parts of a bomb were being transported by a terrorist
group on a commercial flight.260 There was uncertainty as
to whether the bomb was assembled or unassembled, and
the FBI did not know the identity of the couriers, what the
suitcase or suitcases looked like, and whether the bomb
was in one or more suitcases. Grave and potentially immi-
nent danger was found.26' Upon the totality of these fac-
tors, the court concluded that exigent circumstances
existed.262
The defendants' second argument, relying on the pri-
mary purpose test, was that the FBI's primary purpose for
the wireless surveillance had shifted from an intelligence
investigation to a criminal investigation. The primary
purpose test is premised on the idea that the foreign intel-
ligence exception to the warrant requirement is applicable
"only when the surveillance is conducted 'primarily' for
foreign intelligence reasons. 2 6 3 The defendants argued
257 Id. at 962.
25 United States v. Nikzad, 739 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984).
259 United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984).
2- Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 962.
261 Id. at 964.
262 Id. at 962.
265 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
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that the FBI would, therefore, be required to obtain au-
thorization under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,21 and not FISA.
The Sarkissian court rejected this argument, declining to
decide the issue, but refused to "draw too fine a distinc-
tion between criminal and intelligence investigations. ' 6 5
In fact, there is no requirement in FISA that the "crime"
even be related to foreign intelligence. The legislative his-
tory of Section 1801(h)(3) of FISA explains:
[T]he committee believes that dissemination should be
permitted to State and local law enforcement officials. If
Federal agents monitoring a foreign intelligence surveil-
lance authorized under this chapter were to overhear in-
formation relating to a violation of State criminal law...
the agents could hardly be expected to conceal such infor-
mation from the appropriate local officials.266
The Sarkissian holding that the crime need not be re-
lated to foreign intelligence was confirmed by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Isa. 67 FISA
was used to monitor telephone conversations of Isa and
his wife, who were later charged by the State of Missouri
with first-degree murder of their daughter. Missouri had
obtained the telephone recordings of murder conversa-
tions from the FBI, which had been conducting electronic
surveillance of Isa. It was believed that Isa, a native-born
Palestinian, had contacts and continuing communication
with a terrorist organization, the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
The Isa court rejected the defendant's argument that
2- Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (Title III codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-20 (1988)). The 1968 Omnibus Act requires police to acquire a warrant
prior to using microphone or wiretapping surveillance, and states that a warrant
shall not issue unless probable cause has been found by a neutral magistrate. 18
U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a), (b) (1988).
265 Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965.
2- S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4029; see also In re Kevork, 788 F.2d 566, 570 (9th Cir. 1986)
(providing authorization for use of electronic surveillance information in foreign
criminal prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder and murder).
267 923 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1991).
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the tapes contained a private domestic matter which was
not relevant material under FISA. 68 Citing an unpub-
lished opinion with approval, 69 the court maintained that
"when a monitoring agent overhears evidence of domes-
tic criminal activity, it would be a subversion of his oath of
office if he did not forward that information to the proper
prosecuting authorities. '2 70
V. CONCLUSION
Since the adoption of the Air Transportation Security
Act eighteen years ago, airline hijackings and terrorist in-
cidents directed toward United States carriers, originating
in the United States, have become a rarity. Americans un-
derstand and accept the need for protection in the air
from criminals and political zealots and readily submit to
metal detectors and x-ray machines everyday without
much thought. 27' The President's Commission on Avia-
tion Security even found unacceptable the idea of holding
out in all cases a criminal standard of proof before any
action was taken. The Commission stated that the United
States must be ready to view terrorist attacks as a matter
of national security.272 From the standpoint of those per-
sons concerned about the protection of their Fourth
Amendment privacy rights, however, the singling out of a
passenger based on the contents of his person or luggage
is a permanent threat to privacy.
The Terry stop-and-frisk search, the administrative
2- Id. at 1304.
28 United States v. Hawamda, No. 89-56-A, 1989 WL 235836 (E.D. Va. Apr.
17, 1989).
270 Isa, 923 F.2d at 1305. Other courts of appeals have approved the use of
surveillance information of criminal activity resulting from foreign intelligence
surveillance activity. See, e.g., United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 (4th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988); Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 790-9 1; United
States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 937
(1988); United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 147-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
271 It is estimated that at airports alone, over one billion screenings - four for
every man, woman and child in the United States - are conducted annually.
Klarfeld v. United States, 962 F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1992).
272 President's Commission Report, supra note 3, at 115.
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search, the border search, and a search based on consent
are all possible justifications for airport security searches.
The strong government interest in frustrating terrorism
has been examined in the context of these four ap-
proaches. The protections granted by the courts are ade-
quate to assure that the goals achieved by airport searches
do not hinder the constitutional rights of commercial air
travelers. The biggest concern, namely that an adminis-
trative search specifically for bombs and weapons might
expand into a generalized law enforcement search of all
passengers as a condition for boarding a flight, is real.
The current approach taken by the majority of United
States courts, however, is the constitutionally correct
manner to assure passengers that their rights will not be
infringed by an overly zealous security agent.
Applying FISA to those who conspire to hijack commer-
cial flights is another method used to prevent the spread
of air piracy and terrorism. The argument that FISA is
limited to foreign intelligence gathering, furthermore, has
been rejected by many of the circuit courts. Law enforce-
ment officers are duty bound to turn over any and all in-
formation that may be used to stop air piracy, even absent
a foreign intelligence connection.
While we live in uneasy times, and the need for vigi-
lance is obvious, Americans today enjoy the greatest level
of commercial air travel protection that has ever existed in
this country. The intrusion into the privacy interests of
Americans is minimal. The government's interest in com-
munity safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh
an individual's interest in freedom from certain aspects of
governmental scrutiny. Commercial air travel is one of
these appropriate circumstances.
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